Analytical Perspective on Ghana’s Intelligence Management Practices September 28, 2021. The increasing demand for valuable intelligence in support of law enforcement and conduct of national security and diplomacy requires adequate investments in building intelligence capability to counter threats to peace and security. While many countries continue to initiate reforms to position their security services in response to emerging threats, issue of intelligence management continue to pose challenge to national security managers. In assessing this subject in relation to the employment of intelligence as security management tool in some notable violent incidents in the country, I have examined reports of the Ejura Shooting Committee and Ayawaso West Wuogon Shooting Commission reports. It is worth noting that in both instances, the said operations that led to injuries and/or deaths and destruction of properties were said to have been intelligence-led, bringing to question the value or quality of intelligence available to security managers and the instruments used in dealing with the threats identified. Indeed, the Ayawaso Commission, like the Ejura Committee could not establish the existence of any intelligence as basis for operational deployments, and also lack of co-ordination among heads of security agencies and among field operatives. The Ejura Committee makes interesting findings about lack of co-ordination of security activites among the various actors, police, military, and Regional Security Council (REGSEC), leading to the escalated violence that claimed lives and properties. Of critical importance are findings No. 21, 22 and 23 bothering on information of possible violence and how that information was handled to avert the occurrence. While the committee doubted such intelligence was available to the district security authorities, it also found that there was no co-ordination of security activities, leading to the shootings. It is clear from the evidence of the security chiefs at the district and regionals levels ie District Police Commander, Deputy Regional Police Commander, Regional Security Liaison Officer and Regional Minister (Chairman of REGSEC), that there was no professional handling on information and/or intelligence if any at all was available. This finding is further re-enforced by media pronouncements of the regional minister of having personally ordered the deployment of the military to Ejura based on his own intelligence received from undisclosed sources in Ejura. The national security architecture as elaborated in Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030) makes REGSECs and DISECs part of the national security management structures. The Act makes these bodies responsible for pre-empting breaches to peace and security, and taking appropriate measures to safeguard security at the regional and district levels. Like the National Security Council, REGSECs and DISECs have representations from the various security agencies with the regional ministers and district chief executives as chairpersons. In same manner as the President has at his disposal intelligence and security advice from the National Security Council through the National Security Co-ordinator and inputs from members of the Council, same is expected of the regional minister and DCE. It is instructive to note that the role played by the Bureau of National Intelligence (NIB) which is the primary domestic intelligence organization was lost on the committee as neither the District Officer NIB nor the Regional Commander NIB was invited to testify. These officers are key in terms of providing early warning information and intelligence to DISEC and REGSEC on developments that pose threats to peace and security of their areas of commands. It was therefore expected that NIB intelligence would have been fed to DISEC and REGSEC on planned violence by youth of the area to enable the needed action by the appropriate agency. It is therefore strange in the scheme of things that the Chairman of REGSEC claimed publicly in the media and in his evidence before the committee that he personally ordered the deployment of military and that he relied on ‘intelligence’ received from his own undisclosed sources in Ejura. This is condemnable and affront to established standards in security management, where it was expected that REGSEC will have provided him with advice based on professional intelligence analysis and security assessment by the appropriate security agency and inputs from professional representatives on REGSEC. It is normal in practice that in operational circumstances quick decisions are taken to direct enforcement action, and the intelligence system should be well placed to handle such situations rather than the regional minister relying on unevaluated intelligence sources to take such critical decision as use of military in quelling civil disorder. It is without doubt, based on the committee’s findings that REGSEC at that instance collapsed, leaving the regional minister to rely on his own non-professional intelligence assessment in intervening in the Ejura disturbances, further worsening the situation and this calls for grave concern. A further demonstration of weak intelligence and security co-ordination is the undefined role of government appointed Regional Security Liaison Officer (Regional Security Co-ordinator) whose position within the national security management structure is still vague. While the National Security Co-ordinator who is head of the security and intelligence community, has control over the NIB and other national intelligence agencies such as the Research Department (foreign intelligence agency) and National Signals Bureau (communication and signal intelligence agency) to whom these agencies submit intelligence reports, the Regional Security Co-ordinator in practice has no such power over the Regional Commander NIB. This makes the Regional Security Co-ordinator bereft of actual intelligence reports except briefings provided by Regional Commander NIB at REGSEC sittings. In his evidence before the committee, the Regional Security Co-ordinator detailed his functions as collecting and transmitting intelligence to National Security Council Secretariat through sources he cultivates in the districts. It is evident from these revelations that there is duplication of collection functions at the regional level such that the Regional Commander NIB, Regional Security Co-ordinator and Regional Minister independently collect and disseminate intelligence. The disjointed relationship between the Regional Security Co-ordinator and regional minister is an anomaly that needs to be rectified. In addition to this, is the fact that the Regional Security Co-ordinator does not have power over the Regional Commander NIB unlike